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THE VIEWS OF "CHARTERISTS" AND
"SKEPTICS" ON HUMAN RIGHTS
IN THE WORLD LEGAL ORDER:
Two Wrongs Don't Make A Right
Lowell F. Schechter*
This Symposium on The Future of Human Rights in the
World Legal Order has been sparked by the incendiary works of
two authors, James S. Watson' and Eric Lane. 2 Both Watson and
Lane open fire with gruesome accounts of governments abusing
their own citizens. Lane cites the mass killings in Uganda and
Cambodia, 3 while Watson is somewhat more catholic in his survey,
recounting many other recent incidents of governments torturing,
4
maiming, and killing their peoples.
The two "skeptics" use these examples of extreme governmental abuse of human rights to challenge legal scholars who claim that
the world legal order has widely accepted and effectuated rules
protecting human rights. Watson, in particular, blazes away at the
"charterists," that is, at those who maintain that the United Nations Charter and subsequent resolutions and treaties spawned by
the United Nations have created an international regime of human
rights. He writes:
With increasing frequency one reads of governments killing,
torturing and imprisoning their citizens, almost on a routine basis. Yet at the same time one may read learned articles in the legal literature which, with practiced ease, assure us that such
abuses of governmental power are subject to an international regime of human rights. This discrepancy poses serious questions
* Professor of Law, Vermont Law School. B.A., 1965, New York University; J.D.,

1969, Harvard University.
1. Watson, Legal Theory, Efficacy and Validity in the Development of Human
Rights Norms in InternationalLaw, 1979 U. ILL. L. F. 609.
2. Lane, Demanding Human Rights: A Change in the World Legal Order, 6
HOFSTRA L. REv. 269 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Lane, Demanding Human Rights];
Lane, Mass Killing by Governments: Lawful in the World Legal Order?, 12 N.Y.U. J.
INT'L L. & POL. 239 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Lane, Mass Killing].
3. Lane, Mass Killing, supra note 2, at 239-41.
4. Watson, supra note 1, at 610-12.
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concerning both the validity and the efficacy of the alleged rules,
questions which should be of concern to any theorist who sees
the role of international law as something5 more than disembodied ethical statements or wishful thinking.
Both Watson and Lane reach the same conclusion: The current legal order does not provide an effective regime for the protection of human rights. 6 But, having reached this conclusion, the
authors part company at the point of suggesting solutions to this
problem.
Lane's course is clearly illuminated: He picks up the torch of
the charterists. If the current world legal system, despite the efforts of the past thirty-five years, does not and cannot adequately
protect human rights, then it must undergo radical change. If the
traditional concept of state sovereignty is the major obstacle in the
path of progress, this barrier must be thrust aside. Lane writes:
To accommodate the changing political realities regarding human
rights in the world order requires a change in the world legal order. Until individuals are treated as the subject of the world legal order, and until procedures are provided for the vindication
of their human rights, there can be no adequate safeguards
against the acts of sovereigns perpetrated upon their own citizens. To accomplish this goal, sovereign power must be reduced, and plenary jurisdiction must be granted to a transna7
tional body.
Lane's clarion call for action rings hollow. For, while he states
a goal-a new world legal order where state sovereignty yields to
individual rights-he admits that this goal is very difficult to reach:
The acceptance of such a jurisprudence requires a change in
conception of sovereign power. This cannot be easily accomplished. In fact, it is more difficult now than when it was first
considered in the aftermath of World War II and during the
early years of the United Nations. Today, state tremors over sovereign atrocities have stabilized, and sovereign self-concern has
reasserted itself as the dominant focus of the world legal order."
Once Lane has made this admission, one expects from him
some plan showing how the difficulties will be overcome or circum-

5. Id. at 610 (footnote omitted).
6. Lane, Mass Killing, supra note 2, at 278; Watson, supra note 1, at 612, 620.
7. Lane, Demanding Human Rights, supra note 2, at 295.
8. Lane, Mass Killing, supra note 2, at 279.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol9/iss2/3

2

Schechter: The Views of "Charterists" and "Skeptics" on Human Rights in the
1981]

CHARTERISTS AND SKEPTICS

vented and the ultimate goal reached. Lane, however, follows up
his admission of the difficulties involved in changing the world legal order with only the following brief passage on how the transformation is to be wrought:
As is evidenced by the experience in Uganda and
Cambodia, the legal protection of human rights continues to remain solely a state matter. This focus, however, is not without
some distraction. The growing world demand for the protection
of human rights is exerting pressure for accommodation within
the world legal order. Additionally, the existence of the United
Nations as at least a partially independent institution, with its
own Charter-directed goals, creates an alternative power center
which can sometimes be used for pressure as a check against
wayward state activities. While these conditions may inevitably
result in the necessary change in the world legal order, the pace
is slow, and the course is dangerous. 9
Issue can be taken with almost every statement made in this
passage. Is there really a growing demand for the protection of human rights, especially as compared with the period immediately
following World War II? Is the United Nations even a partially independent institution? Even if there is an increasing public demand for human rights and even if the United Nations can assert
some independent pressure towards human rights protection, how
do these two facts lead to the conclusion that a significant change
in the world legal order is "inevitable?"
Taken as a whole the concluding passage of Lane's article
sounds very optimistic. But, it resonates in a way that suggests that
Lane is forced into being optimistic about the future because he
has found the present so bleak. Lane, in fact, seems to be suffering
from what Watson at his most perceptive has diagnosed as the occupational disease of Western human rights scholars-unsubstantiated optimism:
With depressing regularity the reader of human rights literature in the international law field will find in the concluding
paragraphs of the typical article an exhortation to optimism or
hope, almost invariably expressed in the passive voice in order
to increase its apparent authority. What such remarks indicate is
of course that the true basis for the writer's argument is not to
be found within the confines of international law, but rather in
his or her perception of human nature. 10
9. Id. at 279-80 (footnotes omitted).
10. Watson, supra note 1, at 627 (footnotes omitted).
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As to Watson's own view of the course of action mandated by
the failure of the existing world legal order to provide meaningful
human rights protection, we are left somewhat in the dark. There
is a clear commandment, writ large in fiery letters, to all scholars
and publicists: Thou shalt not take the state's role in the creation of
international law in vain. Do not insist that there are effective international norms protecting human rights when these norms have
not been endorsed by state practice. 1 ' However, Watson provides
no direct guidance as to the specific steps human rights activists
might take to improve human rights protection in the world legal
order.12
Nevertheless, some of Watson's remarks do suggest the general approach he might advocate, if he were to abandon his role of
scholarly critic for that of human rights architect. Watson maintains
that in the current decentralized legal order, a norm can be effective only if other states are willing to sanction a state that has violated that norm. 13 But Watson seems to believe that most states do
not have a sufficient interest in human rights violations within another nation to impel them to take action against the violating nation's government. Only when a state's own nationals have been
abused may there be a sufficient spur to action.' 4 If Watson is correct in his belief that the effective enforcement of human rights
norms is doomed to failure under the current legal order, it would
seem that the only way to achieve human rights protection would
be to follow Lane's advice and try to change the legal order.
Watson, in contrast to Lane, however, is not eager to pick up
the torch of reform. Watson is afraid that this torch may not shed
more light, but, as it were, may burn those who carry it:
Even if one were to believe it possible for a few members of the
English-speaking academic elite to overthrow the nation-state,
the immediate question to be asked is what is to be put in its
place. Here the proponents of the new international law fall
markedly silent as to specifics, though many obviously favor
11. Id. at 633-35.
12. Watson appeared on a panel, Perspectives on Enforcement of Human
Rights, at the 1980 Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law
(Washington, April 17, 1980), at which this author was present. Questioned as to
what specific steps he would recommend to improve human rights protection, given
his analysis of the limitations of the current world legal order, Watson declined to
answer.
13. Watson, supra note 1, at 619.
14. Id.
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"some form of central guidance .... ." What this ominous "central form of guidance" is and how it is to be achieved by peaceful
means are not fully explained. Unless we are talking about a revolution of the human spirit, the proposed system of regulating
conduct will have to be by external means. This would mean
that the only substitute for the horizontal international order is a
vertical order, a super-state of some kind .

. .

. Precisely why

this super-state, however administered, will be free from the ills
15
of the present smaller states is nowhere clarified.
Reading Watson's article is a profoundly depressing experience. If
he is correct, little can be done to protect human rights in the current world legal order, and any change that is possible may well be
a change for the worse.
The natural urge in responding to Watson's article is to try to
find fault with his arguments, to try to prove that he is being unduly pessimistic. I have succumbed to this urge, because I believe
that in certain respects Watson has overstated his case. This is especially true regarding the current status and effectiveness of human rights norms. The first section of this Article is therefore entitled, The Current Status of Human Rights: The World According
to Watson?
But, in another respect, neither Lane nor Watson goes far
enough in his criticism of traditional human rights scholars. Most of
these writers-and Lane and Watson as well-define the issue of
protecting human rights in terms of preventing governments from
abusing their own citizens. Their concern is to stop the killings in
Uganda or the torture in Chile. Yet, it is arguable that for every
person shot to death in Uganda, one hundred starve to death in
other African states. For every person who has suffered from torture in Chile, thousands in Latin America have suffered from treatable but untreated diseases. If the world legal order is to protect
the individual, it is not enough to restrain governments from
abusing their citizens. The legal order must also prevent governments from neglecting their citizens. The implications of this
broader concept of human rights protection are discussed here in
the second section, The Future of Human Rights: Taking Basic Human Needs Into Account?
One implication of a broader definition of human rights is that
it may necessitate extremely radical changes in the legal order to
15. Id. at 63940 (footnote omitted) (quoting Falk, A New Paradigmfor International Legal Studies: Prospects and Proposals,84 YALE L. J. 969, 977, 980 (1975)).
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protect these rights. Here we come again to the question of
whether very basic changes in the world legal order are possible.
Even Lane, who advocates such changes, admits that it may be
more difficult to reform the system today than it was in the period
after World War 11.16 In fact, it can be argued that it will be infinitely more difficult to make such changes in the future than it is
today. Unchecked growths in population, decreased stability of
governments, decaying environments, and declining economies
may all block future progress in providing effective protection for
human rights. These potential obstacles are dealt with in this Arti-

cle's final section, The Future of Human Rights: Is a New, Improved World Legal Order Possible in the 1980's?
THE CURRENT STATUS OF HUMAN RIGHTS:
THE WORLD ACCORDING TO WATSON?

In the course of attacking the charterists for letting wishful
thinking blind them to current realities, Watson points out certain
pitfalls that confront scholars working in the international law field:
The scholar in international law is engaged in the selection of
material from a vast reservoir which is then interpreted and
presented in some coherent manner .... At all stages the pro-

cess is very subjective, and the eventual outcome cannot help
but be affected by an unconscious predisposition of the writer,

either towards a particular conclusion, or else towards the genteel pastime of reaffirming one's own beliefs at a universal level

Over and above the problem of unconscious bias, one finds
in some international law literature the displacement of the aca-

demic finction to a greater or lesser extent by advocacy of a particular proposition or support for the legitimacy of a particular

state's foreign policy. 17

Curiously, while Watson clearly recognizes the dangers these
pitfalls present to others, he himself plunges headlong into them.
He is so intent on pressing his attack, on showing that the charterists' vision of the world is distorted, that he refuses to stop to examine any evidence that might impede his attack or conflict with
his own world view. This section will focus on two key areas in his
dark portrait of the world, where Watson the "advocate" seems to
have overpowered Watson the "scholar": His depiction of the cur16. See Lane, Demanding Human Rights, supra note 2, at 279-85.
17. Watson, supra note 1, at 637 (footnotes omitted).
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rent human rights situation as one of growing violations met by almost totally ineffective international action1 8 and his prophecy that
the current situation cannot improve because a state's violation of
its citizens' fights is never of sufficient interest to other states to
impel them to sanction the wrongdoer. 19
Is Watson's bleak assessment of the current state of human
rights protection an accurate one? It must be noted that he is not
the first surveyor of the human rights scene to give a pessimistic
appraisal. Others before him have noted a wide discrepancy be20
tween rights granted on paper and wrongs inflicted in practice,
and have claimed that such violations are, in fact, increasing. 21
For several reasons, these pessimistic assessments cannot be
conclusively disproved. First, in weighing the efficacy of current
human fights protection, it is relatively easy to find violations that
have occurred and to place them on one side of the scale. It is
much more difficult, however, to produce the evidence for the
other side-that is, violations that have not occurred or have taken
a milder form because of the existence of international standards
and enforcement machinery.
Second, even if all the evidence on both sides of the issue
could be produced, there would remain the problem of weighing
each piece of evidence. How, for example, does one balance the
return of free elections to 600 million people in India with the
slaughter of 1 million in Cambodia? If Watson or Lane were to argue on the basis of these two factors that the world human lights
situation on balance had deteriorated, could anyone prove them
wrong?
Third, any assessment is influenced by the scope of the inquiry, that is by how broadly rights are defined. Watson and
Lane both confine themselves to discussing political and civil
rights. 2 2 If social and economic rights were included in the weighing process, it is possible that different results might be obtained. 23
18.

Id. at 619.

19. Id. at 624.
20. See, e.g., Kizilbash, United Nations and Human Rights: A Failure Report,
27 PAKISTAN HORIZON 50 (1974).

21. See, e.g., Vogelgesang, Diplomacy of Human Rights, 23 INT'L STUDIES Q.
216, 217-19 (1979).
22. Lane makes only one passing reference to the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No.
16) 49, U.N. Doe. A/6316 (1966). See Lane, Demanding Human Rights, supra note 2,
at 281.
23. For an attempt to develop a system of assessment, including political and
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This problem is brought home by the editors of the annual Freedom House survey of Freedom in the World.24 While they attempt
to make an objective survey and assessment of changes in political
and civil rights throughout the world, they recognize that their
conclusions are subject to challenge.
A common criticism of the Comparative Survey is that it
does not address the crucial concerns of most of the world's people . . . . Some critics believe that the values represented by
civil and political freedoms are not as important as other values
such as food, health, artistic creativity, religious experience or
sense of community. For example, Charles Yost says: ". . . the
American position focuses almost all of its attention on political
and civil rights, where its own traditions are clear and its performance, at least recently, excellent, while minimizing economic and social rights which, to a large part of mankind that is
never sure where its next meal is coming from, are far more urgent." This objection may lead to the assertion that our definition of freedom is too narrow, that it should include enabling
to
freedoms such as those provided by the welfare state, or even
25
the assertion that equality is more important than freedom.
Even if pessimistic assessments cannot be conclusively dis-

proved, they are, however, open to challenge in several respects.
In response to those who maintain we are in an era of increasing
human rights violations, it can be argued that what has increased is
not the violations themselves, but the attention given to them. To
cite an analogous domestic situation, in the last decade there has
been a tremendous increase in the number of reported cases of
child abuse in the United States. 26 Few maintain that there has
been a correspondingly massive increase in the incidence of abuse.
Rather, it is generally accepted that new reporting laws, more pub-

licity, greater public sensitivity to the problem, and broader definicivil and economic and social rights, as well as for a survey of other such attempts,
see Dominguez, Assessing Human Rights Conditions, in ENHANCING GLOBAL HUMAN RIGHTS 19 (Council on Foreign Relations ed. 1979).
24. The first edition of the Survey on Human Rights was Gastil, The New Criteria of Freedom, 17 FREEDOM AT ISSUE 17 (1973). It has been published annually
in each January-February issue of Freedom at Issue, and in the first Freedom House
annual, R. GASTIL, FREEDOM IN THE WORLD (1978) [hereinafter cited as FREEDOM
HOUSE 1978]. The 1978 volume includes relevant articles by several authors, as well
as the annual Survey. The reader should note that each annual Survey discusses
world conditions of the preceding year.
25. FREEDOM HOUSE 1978, supra note 24, at 163.
26. Christopher, Year of the Child, but Abuse Cases Increased, Pa. L.J. Apr. 28,
1980, at 1, col. 3.
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tions of what constitutes abuse have lead to an increase in the reported cases. 2 7 Similar factors are at work on the international
level. These include the growth of comprehensive reporting of human rights violations by Amnesty International28 and other private
organizations, 29 legislation mandating reports by the United States
State Department, 30 and the attention focused, albeit intermittently, by the Carter administration on human rights. 31
Note might be taken of the results of the Freedom House survey over the last decade. While reports in the early 1970's came to
generally negative conclusions-that on balance there was an erosion of human rights-the reports issued in 1978, 1979, and 1980
were much more positive, suggesting that on balance progress was
being made in reducing violations. 32 In short, a case can be made
that the newspaper headlines that lead Watson to utter cries of
woe document not a growing problem, but rather a growing
awareness of the problem.
Admittedly, even if human rights violations did not grow
worse in the 1970's, they were still bad enough. In fact, the most
grievous of these violations-the mass killings in Cambodia and
Uganda-have been used by Lane and others to demonstrate the
inadequacy of the current system of protection. These gross violations clearly demonstrate that the current international system is
far from fully effective. But do they prove the current system is totally ineffective?
Many would say yes. For them, mass killings are the litmus
test of effectiveness. The obvious initial objective in any drive to
protect human rights is the elimination of extreme, large-scale violations. The experiences in Cambodia and Uganda show that even
this, the most basic objective, has not been achieved. On the other
hand, it can be argued that the development of an effective international regime protecting human rights is still at an early or intermediate stage. While logically it would be nice to begin by
27. Hearings on S.1191 Before the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Children and
Youth, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) (statement of Dr. David G. Gil), reprinted in D.
GIL, VIOLENCE AGAINST CHILDREN 96-102 (1970).
28. See, e.g., AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, REPORT ON POLITICAL PRISONERS
HELD IN SECRET DETENTION CAMPS IN CHILE (1977).
29. See, e.g., CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE, SYNOPSES
OF THE UNITED NATIONS CASES IN THE FIELD OF PEACE AND SECURITY (1966).

30. See, e.g., 22 U.S.C. § 286(e)-10 (Supp. III 1979).
31. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, May 3, 1977, at 1, col. 2.
32. R. GASTIL, FREEDOM IN THE WORLD 25 (1979) [hereinafter cited as FREEDOM HOUSE 1979]; FREEDOM HOUSE 1978, supra note 24, at 30.
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eliminating the worst violations and proceed from there, in practice, the efficacy of the system is determined not by the magnitude
of the violation, but by other factors.
As both Watson and Lane point out, we are living in a system
where sanctioning human rights violators is basically left to other
states. Asbjorn Eide of the International Peace Research Institute
in Oslo, Norway, suggests that the effectiveness of sanctions will
depend on two factors:
When an incumbent regime in a country has firm control of
its population, it seems unlikely that external human rights reactions will have a significant impact. If, on the other hand, the incumbent regime of the addressee country has an insecure position . . . the impact of external reactions will depend upon the
influence of the reacting country. Where the addressee country
is heavily dependent on the reacting country, the impact will of-

ten be positive

....

33

While Eide's analysis helps to explain why international reaction,

especially from the West, would be particularly ineffective in the
case of Cambodia, it ignores another critical factor. When Eide
states that violating governments will curtail their behavior when

confronted with sanctions the harmful effects of which outweigh
the benefits of continued violations, he assumes that there are rational decisionmakers at the head of the governments. All sanctions, short of outright invasion, may fail if the leadership is
irrational-if it is incapable of applying a cost-benefit analysis. Cutting off aid, stopping coffee imports, and other economic and political sanctions may have no effect on an Idi Amin, for instance. The

necessary action---direct military action to remove the irrational
leader-is the sanction most difficult to achieve in the current
states' rights-oriented system. Given these factors, Uganda and
Cambodia represent the types of cases where the international response to human rights violations is the least likely to stop the violations. However, they do not necessarily mean that the current
system will fail in all cases.
Turning to Watson's article in particular, the most serious flaw
in his presentation is his failure to consider any positive evidence
in evaluating the current scene. For example, he does not mention
the European Convention on Human Rights or the case law being
developed under that convention by the European Commission of
33. Eide, The World of Human Rights, 23 INT'L STUDIES Q. 246, 268 (1979).
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Human Rights and the European Human Rights Court. 34 Nor does
he mention the impact that other Western European countries
have had on the progress toward greater political and civil rights in

Spain and Portugal. 35 Nowhere does he discuss the successes, however limited, of bilateral government actions. 3 6 Nor does he devote
any space to the successful work of private organizations in the human rights field. 37 Watson might still have weighed in with the
same assessment, that there is no effective system of protection, if

he had placed all the evidence on the scales. But, as he has not
done so, he cannot expect others to accept his short measure.

If Watson is guilty of suppressing evidence when dealing with
the current status of human rights, he is also guilty of an equally
serious offense-presenting no evidence at all in dealing with future prospects for human rights protection. Watson repeatedly asserts that the situation cannot be improved within the current

state-centered legal order because when one state violates the
rights of its citizens the violation is of insufficient interest to other

states to provoke action against the wrongdoer. 38 He never pro34. For a recent summary of the accomplishments of the European Convention
machinery, see Robertson, Human Rights: A Global Assessment, in HUMAN RIGHTS
AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 13-16 (D. Kommers & G. Loescher eds. 1979). For
a discussion of the Convention's impact on England, see text accompanying note 132
infra.
35.

See Medina, Spain in Europe, 11 GOVT & OPPOSrTION 143 (1976).

36. See text accompanying note 46 infra.
37. For a description of the activities of the major nongovernmental organizations, see Note, The Role of Nongovernmental Organizations in Implementing Human Rights in Latin America, 7 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 477 (1977). For a
discussion of the effectiveness of non-governmental organizations, see Wiseberg &
Scoble, Monitoring Human Rights Violations, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND AMERICAN
FOREIGN POLICY, supra note 34, at 194-202:

A first problem in judging effectiveness is that there is no material product that the organization sells in a market, the allegedly "hidden hand" of
which sets a variable price that supposedly puts supply and demand into
equilibrium. How is one to put a price on the value of human life? And
there is no way to repay a person for years of wrongful imprisonment for political thought and association. Therefore, even if the World Council of
Churches seems to be making an excessive budgetary expenditure to gain
the release of a small number of political prisoners and even if it is not successful, nevertheless, the external publicity it receives may save those prisoners from summary execution, may prevent the secret police from engaging
in the worst forms of torture, or may bring even a brief pause in the regime's
systematic repression. And how does one qualify such results in terms of
dollars and cents?
Id. at 195-96 (emphasis in original).
38. See text accompanying notes 14, 19 supra.
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vides any evidence to support this assertion, but seems to take it as
self-evident. Admittedly, there are situations where third-party
states have little interest in a human rights violation, and, even if a
third-party state does have some interest, there may be reasons
why it may still refuse to take action. 39 Yet there are also situations
where one state's treatment of its nationals may be of great interest
to other states, and there are forces that may impel these interested states to take measures against the wrongdoer.
First, a state may see a link between today's internal suppression in a neighboring state and tomorrow's external aggression.
One of the motivating factors in establishing the European Convention on Human Rights was the belief that maintaining individual rights within each of the member countries would help to forestall the rise of totalitarian regimes that might threaten other states
40
in the community.
Second, violations of rights in one state may directly impact on
other states in many ways. Watson's assertion that "one state's
treatment of its citizens is of little interest to other states" 41 seems
rather ludicrous in light of recent developments in the United
States-such as the influx of political refugees from Cuba and "economic refugees" from Haiti, the continued flow of impoverished
Mexicans across the border, and the political assassinations taking
place in Washington. 42 The ideas put into practice in one state may
also impact on neighboring states-be they new methods of protecting rights or new ways of violating them. 43 Drawing on his experience with the Freedom House Comparative Survey of Freedom, Gastil concludes that political trends in neighboring or
related states are frequently copied. 44
39. The classic case is the United States' relationship with the Republic of
South Korea, where the concern over human rights violations has been counterbalanced by the fear of weakening the South vis-a-vis the North. For a critique of the
Carter administration's attempt to balance idealism and self-interest in its human
rights policy, see Forsythe, American Foreign Policy and Human Rights: Rhetoric
and Reality, 2 UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS 35 (1980).
40. A. ROBERTSON, HUMAN RIGHTS IN EUROPE 3-4 (1977); G. WEIL, THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 22 (1963).

41. Watson, supra note 1, at 619 (footnote omitted).
42. For example, consider the assassinations of Orlando Letelier, N.Y. Times,
Sept. 22, 1976, at 1, col. 2, and Ali Akbar Tabatabai, former press attache at the Iranian embassy in Washington, D.C., 1980 FACTS ON FILE 545.

43. Consider, for example, the rapid spread of the technique of having opponents of a governing regime in South America simply "disappear." N.Y. Times, Dec.
10, 1979, at 9, col. 1.
44.

FREEDOM HOUSE 1979, supra note 32, at 10.
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Third, national boundaries do not necessarily cut off vital links
of interest and communication between peoples. It is doubtful
whether many other Africans would maintain that South Africa's
policy of discrimination towards its black majority is of "little interest" to them.
Fourth, there are political and ideological forces that may impel governments to actively oppose human rights violations in foreign countries. In the United States, for example, outspoken opposition to human rights violations may serve both the domestic and
foreign policy objectives of an administration: It plays well with
audiences at home and provides a useful ideological weapon in international fora. In the case of the smaller Scandinavian nations,
human rights may give their governments an opportunity to have a
45
positive impact on international affairs.
It is often difficult to evaluate the effectiveness of measures
taken against a wrongdoer. On the rare occasion when one state
has used force against another, such as the Indian invasion of East
Pakistan, it may be possible to say that one state's actions did halt
another state's violations.4 6 In situations where economic or diplomatic pressures have been employed, it is almost impossible to
demonstrate conclusively that any improvement in the human
rights situation was caused by the pressure. Self-serving statements
of Carter administration officials as to the effectiveness of United
States pressure for change must be viewed with skepticism. Much
more compelling is the testimony of those whose rights have been
violated, such as Soviet dissidents and refuseniks who believe that
Western pressure on the Soviet Union has lead to their plight's
47
amelioration.
It is ironic that in arguing his case that there is no effective international protection of human rights, Watson relies, in part, on
examples of abuse drawn from Rupert Emerson's article, The Fate

of Human Rights in The Third World.48 One may agree with
Emerson's conclusion that the new states have not lived up to "the
45. Eide, supra note 33, at 246-47.
46. While on this occasion India's action was clearly effective in ending human
rights violations by Pakistan, the purity of India's humanitarian motivation was questionable in light of her traditional hostility to Pakistan. For a discussion of the legitimacy of the Indian intervention, see R. LILLICH & F. NEWMAN, INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS 485 (1979).
47. See Dean, Contacts with the West: The Dissidents' View of Western Support for the Human Rights Movement in the Soviet Union, 2 UNIVERSAL HUMAN
RIGHTS 47 (1980); N.Y. Times, Nov. 16, 1976, at 17, col. 1.
48. 27 WORLD POL. 201 (1975).
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brave hopes and expectations that marked their birth. . . ."9 But
one must also recognize that the granting of independence from
colonial rule to these states, at least from the Third World viewpoint, was the most significant advance in human rights in our
time-an advance brought about in part by the very international
pressures that Watson has ignored.
THE FUTURE OF HUMAN RIGHTS:
TAKING BASIC HUMAN NEEDS INTO ACCOUNT?

Watson's assessment of the current human rights situation is

not only inaccurate, it is also woefully incomplete. Riveting his attention on the enforcement of civil and political rights, Watson
never examines the enforcement of social and economic rights. Yet,
as this Article's introduction points out, 50 if one is truly concerned
with the well-being of individuals on this planet, one must be as
concerned with governments that deprive their citizens of food,
shelter, medical care, and education as with governments that repress their citizens by imprisonment, torture, and execution.
The idea that a government is responsible for the social and
economic well-being of its citizens is not new. For example, in discussing the state's role in traditional Islamic law, Abdul Aziz Said
has written that
if it is the duty of the leadership of the Islamic polity to regulate
individuals' "right of use" of material possessions, it is also their
duty to see that individuals are granted the right to life, that is,
the right to have their basic needs met.
While wealth is not a virtue in Islam, neither is poverty; for
extreme poverty leads to non-belief. Muslims must enjoy a sufficiency of food, clothing, and housing for their persons and families.
Thus Islam emphasizes the obligation of the state to meet the
people's essentials of life: in the public treasury there must be a
fixed portion for the poor, needy, and distressed. 5 '

Since the end of World War II, the importance of fundamental social and economic rights has come to be recognized, not only by
the governments of Socialist and Third World countries, but by
49. Id.
50. See text accompanying notes 15-16 supra.
51. Said, Human Rights in Islamic Perspectives, in
Pollis & P. Schwab eds. 1979).
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Western governments as well. 52 Even the United States government has acknowledged the importance of including the satisfaction
of basic economic and social needs within the definition of human
rights. As Secretary of State Cyrus Vance remarked, in making one
of the Carter administration's first major policy statements on human rights:
Let me define what we mean by "human rights."
First, there is the right to be free from governmental violation of the integrity of the person ....
Second, there is the right to the fulfillment of such vital
needs as food, shelter, health care, and education. We recognize
that the fulfillment of this right will depend, in part, upon the
stage of a nation's economic development. But we also know that
this right can be violated by a government's action or inactionfor example, through corrupt official processes which divert resources to an elite at the expense of the needy or through indifference to the plight of the poor.
Third, there is the right to enjoy civil and political liberties....
53
Our policy is to promote all these rights.
The right to fulfillment of basic needs must be considered not
only in assessing the current status of human rights protection, but
also in forecasting developments in the 1980's and beyond. This
section of the Article is devoted to considering both the prospect
for progress in meeting the right to basic needs and the relationship between the promotion of this right and the advancement of
civil and political rights.
The problem of meeting basic human needs is a major theme
in the Council on Foreign Relation Relations' 1980s Project-a
series of interrelated studies designed to forecast and analyze issues
likely to be of major international concern in the next ten to
twenty years. Studies in two of the volumes, Rich and Poor Na-

52. For a detailed survey, see M. GANJI, THE REALIZATION OF ECONOMIC,
SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS: PROBLEMS, POLICIES, PROGRESS (1975); see I.
DUCHACEK, RIGHTS & LIBERTIES LI THE WORLD TODAY: CONSTITUTIONAL PROM1SE & REALITY 105 (1973).
53. Address by Secretary Vance, Law Day ceremonies at University of Georgia
(April 30, 1977), reprinted in 76 DEPT. STATE BULL. 505, 505 (1977); see Derian,

Human Rights and United States Foreign Relations: An Overview, 10 CASE W. RES.
J. INT'L L. 243 (1978). For the change in European views over time, see COUNCIL
OF EUROPE, WHAT IS THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE DOING TO PROTECT HUMAN

RIGHTS? 8 (1977).
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tions in the World Economy 54 and Reducing Global Inequities,55

address the problem of "absolute poverty." In her introduction to
Reducing Global Inequities, Catherine Gwin explains the concept
"absolute poverty":
The term absolute poverty as used here and in the essay by
Gunnar Adler-Karlsson refers to a standard of living below what
would universally be recognized as a minimum tolerable
standard. As defined by the World Bank, absolute poverty is
equivalent to a level of annual per capita income of $250 or less.
In describing the global dimensions of absolute poverty, however, Adler-Karlsson relies not on a per capita income figure
alone but on an analysis of its manifestations-i.e., deficiencies
now being suffered by the poor in developing countries in basic
human needs, including food, health care, housing, education,
and remunerative employment. 56

In his study of the dimensions of the absolute-poverty problem,

Gunnar Adler-Karlsson estimates the number of people currently
deprived of basic human needs as between 500 million and 1.2 billion. 57
While several studies in these two volumes discuss possible

economic strategies for dealing with the problem of absolute poverty, Roger Hansen's The Political Economy of North-South Relations: An Overview and an Alternative Approach is the one most
directly concerned with the human rights implications of such
strategies. Hansen concludes:
Finally, there is the human rights issue which is bound to
be linked to the development and implementation of any basic
human needs strategy. The strategy is nothing if not one that focuses on the basic socioeconomic needs of individuals. In this
sense it is non-state-centric in the extreme; its entire raison
d'etre is permanently to elevate the living conditions and life
chances of the poorest segments of all developing-country populations. With its emphasis on asset transfers or asset accumulation in the form of educational, health, and other production-

54.

COUNCIL

ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,

RICH AND

PooR NATIONS

IN THE

WORLD ECONOMY (1978).
55. W. WRIGGINS & G. ADLER-KARLSSON, REDUCING GLOBAL INEQUITIES

(1978).
56. Gwin, Poverty and Inequities-Strategiesfor Change, in W. WRIGGINS & G.
ADLER-KARLSSON, supra note 55, at 1, 2 n.1.

57. Adler-Karlsson, Eliminating Absolute Poverty: An Approach to the Problem, in W. WRIGGINS & G. ADLER-KARLSSON, supra note 55, at 119, 125.
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specific benefits for the poorest, it is a policy that, without ever
saying so, begins to put some flesh on the skeleton of the second
58
half of the UN's Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
Hansen suggests that a commitment by developed states to eliminate absolute poverty in developing nations might have a significant positive influence on the protection of political and civil rights
in the international community:
If the North were willing to extend substantial financial support at the global level for an effort of this kind, might not that
very strategy offer an opportunity to bridge the widening chasm
between developed and developing countries on the issue of human rights in its broadest sense? At the present time the North
(and especially the United States since the advent of the Carter
administration) has pressed vigorously for universal recognition
of those human rights found in the first half of the Universal
Declaration: political, legal, and civil rights that are rooted in
the evolution of Western civilization. But this concentration on
one segment of human rights, no matter how important, may
prove to be counterproductive even in the narrowest sense of
expanding the acceptance of those cherished Western values and
norms.
If, on the other hand, Northern countries were jointly to
advocate and make a substantial financial contribution to those
economic human rights (needs) of the poorest in the developing
countries, they would then be in a far better position to draw
those countries into a serious discussion of political human rights
which seem to be of greatest importance to the developed countries. For the first time since the signing of the Universal Declaration, progress might be made at the global level specifically
because Northern and Southern human rights concepts would be
linked both programmatically and conceptually. 59
Hansen's picture of a new, more people-oriented international
economic order leading to a new, more people-oriented international legal order is a bright one, especially when compared to
Watson's dark view. Perhaps the inclusion of basic human needs in
the human rights agenda for the 1980's will actually help bring
about the changes in the world legal order that Lane demands.

58. Hansen, The Political Economy of North-South Relations: An Overview
and an Alternative Approach, in COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 54,
at 215, 249 (emphasis added).
59. Id. at 250 (emphasis added).
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Unfortunately, while Hansen presents a very desirable ideal for the
1980's, it is an ideal unlikely to be attained.
The first set of obstacles to improving human rights through
meeting basic human needs lies in the developing countries.
Hansen himself recognizes that the governing class in many developing countries may feel threatened by a basic-human-needs approach to economic development because it would redistribute in60
come to the benefit of the poor and the detriment of the elite.
He also recognizes that the governing classes may not adopt a
basic-human-needs approach because they are more concerned
with overall economic growth or with economic freedom from
Western domination. 6 1 Hansen sees active economic assistance
from developed countries as the carrot to lure the governing
classes into accepting his approach. 6 2 There is no guarantee, however, that this particular carrot is tempting enough to cause the
governing classes of developing countries to accept an approach
that would undermine their economic dominance as well as a political and civil rights program that would undermine their political
dominance. On the contrary, attempting to include political and
civil rights along with basic human needs might lead to their rejection of the entire package.
I suggest that there may be a negative, rather than a positive,
association made by developing countries between basic social and
economic needs and political and civil rights. In other words, developing countries may assert that abolishing absolute poverty is
their first priority, and that in order to meet people's basic needs,
it is necessary to sacrifice some political and civil rights.
There are those, especially in the West, who will reject any
such claim as unjustified. For example, Nigel Rodley, Legal Advisor for Amnesty International, states: "I have yet to see, in any
case, a clear, convincing presentation of why, in a given situation,
particular measures to improve the enjoyment of economic, social,
and cultural rights necessarily entail infringements of specific civil
63
and political rights."
60. Id. at 242. See also Fagen, Equity in the South in the Context of NorthSouth Relations, in COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 54, at 189, 189-99.
61. Hansen, supra note 58, at 242. See also Diaz-Alejandro, Delinking North
and South: Unshackled or Unhinged?, in COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra
note 54, at 85.
62. Hansen, supra note 58, at 242. See also J. SEWELL, THE UNITED STATES
AND WORLD DEVELOPMENT AGENDA 1977, at 19 (1977).
63. Rodley, Monitoring Human Rights Violations in the 1980s, in ENHANCING
GLOBAL HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 23, at 117, 130.
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However, clear, convincing examples of situations where political and civil rights might have to be sacrificed to meet basic human needs have been presented by Neville Linton, a senior lecturer at the Institute of International Relations, and William
Demas, President of the Caribbean Development Bank. 64 After
discussing why he believes that economic rights should be given
priority, 65 Linton provides specific examples of the type of political
rights that may have to be sacrificed:
The process of development is a harsh and demanding one.
I know of no state which has developed, in the sense of
achieving a satisfactory standard of living for the majority of its
citizens, without extreme exploitation either at home, abroad or
both ....
Today, with the advantages of technology and science, the
process should be easier but, even at best, it remains painful. It
remains a process which cannot, for instance, afford the luxuries
of full freedom of choice or of movement. As for the first, a state
with limited educational facilities may find it necessary to say to
a young person "You will be an engineer and not a doctor"-in
the manner of Japan, which in its early days allocated careers to
its bright young people. And as for the second, I am firmly of
64.

These were views at a 1977 Seminar on Human Rights and their Promotion

in the Caribbean organized by the International Commission of Jurists and the Organization of Commonwealth Caribbean Bar Associations.
65. [Tlhe new states have appeared on the scene in the second half of the
twentieth century when it is an accepted purpose of the state to advance, in
the widest sense, the welfare of its citizens. This is a responsibility which
implies broad powers of control for the state, to such an extent that even in
Western capitalist states there is increasing centralization and governmental
participation in the economic sector. Now in many of the old Western states,
it might be possible to accomplish such governmental control without necessarily treading too hard on individual rights. This can be done in part because of surpluses from the past, usually purloined through imperialism, and
because of technological advances which permit a high level of living for all
of the citizens. But in new states, with struggling economies, mass welfare
cannot be delivered without a system of control and centralization which
would hardly permit the play of individual rights in the classic tradition.
Against this background then I am arguing that, for most Third World
states, social and economic rights have a priority, at the domestic level, over
the traditional civil and political rights, a rightful priority both because of
the objective conditions within and without these states and because the traditional rights are not necessarily culturally relevant. This is not to suggest
that civil and political rights are unimportant: they are necessary but are
subject to limits within a context of developing an effective welfare state
which benefits all of the people.
Linton, Human Rights and Development, in THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF
JURISTS, HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT 19, 20 (1978).
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the opinion that a "developing" state has the right to prevent a
citizen who has been educated at state expense from emigrating
unless he has given adequate service at home. Beyond this,
whether or not a citizen has been educated at state expense it
can be argued that, in a "developing" state, he should be subject
to the duty of service in hardship areas if his skill is called for.
This suggests that a "developing" state should be somewhat like
a mobilized state-as indeed it is, if properly conceived. It is
like wartime, and a discipline akin to wartime discipline is
needed for the war on want, on hunger, on ill-health, on ignorance and on insecurity, for the war on the depressing cycle of
poverty which kills and maims as effectively as bullets. 66
William Demas discusses both political and economic rights that
will probably have to be "qualified" in order to meet the basic economic and social needs of the people living in the Caribbean area,
such as the absolute right to national self-determination, the absolute right to property, the absolute right to work, and the absolute
right to free collective bargaining. Demas' most telling argument
involves the right to free collective bargaining:
In the developing countries with market or partly-planned economies, it is now generally realized that because of the need to
maximize the rate of saving and investment in both the public
and private sectors, to promote employment opportunities for
all, to promote agricultural and rural development, to protect
the balance of payments, and to promote social justice both between workers and the higher income groups and as between
different categories of workers (in the light of large differences of
productivity between economic sectors), free collective bargaining must be circumscribed by law and that a Prices and Incomes Policy for the whole country needs to be adopted and implemented. For in the absence of such legal circumscription and
of such prices and incomes policies the enjoyment of certain economic and social rights by highly-paid workers must mean the
denial or abridgement of these same economic and social rights
to other less fortunate workers and peasants and the young unemployed.67

While Linton and Demas argue that some rights may have to
be curtailed, they both acknowledge that there are other rights

66. Id. at 21.
67. Demas, Human Rights and Their Promotion, in THE INTERNATIONAL
COMASSION OF JURISTS, supra note 65, at 4, 14.
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that need not be sacrificed on the altar of human needs. Linton,
writing in the New Zealand Law Journal, sums up what he considers to be
. . . the irreducible minimum in basic rights-the right to peaceful assembly and expression, the right to a government based on
the expressed will of the people, the right to take part in the
government, the right to a fir trial, the right to be not subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile,68the right to education and the right to freedom of information.

Demas' list is longer, but somewhat more qualified:
In a developing country . . . it should be possible to have a

wide-range of civil and political rights granted immediately. As a
minimum, I suggest that the following human civil and political
rights should be immediately guaranteed, with as few qualifications as possible in their application:
(a) the right to the fullest possible participation of the
masses of the people in governmental planning and implementation and in the election of both local and central governments;
(b) the right to freedom of thought, assembly, expression,
association, and religious worship;
(c) the right to freedom from arbitrary arrest and imprisonment, and to the enjoyment of the Rule of Law; subject
to any temporary infringement of these rights that may
be necessary under a State of Emergency;
(d) the right to freedom from forced labour, coercion, and
inhuman or degrading forms of punishment such as the
69
barbarous practice of torture.
In adopting this two-tiered approach, Linton and Demas attempt to prevent using basic human needs as an all too handy, but

unjustified, excuse for massive human rights violations. Unfortunately, once it is admitted that some rights are subject to sacrifice,
it is very difficult to draw a firm line in protecting others. Linton's

and Demas' lists of inviolate political and civil rights are not in
complete agreement.70 More important, there is no guarantee that

68. Linton, World Development, Change and the Challenge of Human Rights,
1978 NEW ZEALAND L. J. 242, 245.
69. Demas, supra note 67, at 11-12 (emphasis in original).
70. For example, Linton's proposal for forced career choices and forced service
in hardship areas might violate Demas' prohibition of "forced labor." But see
Iversen v. Norway, [1963] Y. B. EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 278.
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either list would be acceptable to the governing classes in developing countries. For example, Dunstan Wai, in "Human Rights in
Sub-Saharan Africa," describes how the basic-needs argument has
often been used by African leaders to justify the curtailment of free
information, a right both Linton and Demas hold inviolate.
A[n] . . . argument is that the priority of African states is
economic development and elimination of hunger, disease, and
illiteracy. In pursuit of such a policy of human advancement, African presidents have contended that they are entitled to formulate developmental ideologies and strategies that will bring their
aspirations and hopes into realization. Hence, critics are detractors and must be locked behind bars to prevent them from "misleading" the masses and from disrupting the efforts of the government in nation-building and economic development. 71
A second set of obstacles to realizing Hansen's ideal lies in the

developed countries. The crucial question is whether the governments of these countries will accept a share of the responsibility for

the well-being of the millions who live in absolute poverty-people
who are not their own nationals, who come from different racial,
cultural, and social backgrounds, and who live in countries thousands of miles away. Surely, such acceptance would involve a drastic change in the world legal order. We would be moving from the
current situation where there is still vociferous debate over the ex-

tent of each state's international responsibility for its treatment of
its own nationals to a system where each state would agree to be

held at least somewhat responsible for the well-being of foreign nationals. It can be argued that the developed countries should assume part of the legal responsibility for people living in absolute
poverty because the developed countries have been at least partially responsible for their impoverishment. This argument has
been made with great force by Oxford economist Keith Griffin:
It is our belief that underdeveloped countries as we observe
them today are a product of historical forces, especially of those
forces released by European expansion and world ascendancy.
Thus they are a relatively recent phenomenon. Europe did not
"discover" the underdeveloped countries; on the contrary, she
created them. In many cases, in fact, the societies with which
Europe came into contact were sophisticated, cultured and
wealthy. 72
71. Wai, Human Rights in Sub-Saharan Africa, in HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note
51, at 115, 120.
72. K. GRIFFIN, UNDERDEVELOPMENT IN SPANISH AMERICA 38 (1969).
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None of the preceding discussion should be taken to imply
that all of the underdeveloped countries were once wealthy soci-

eties and advanced civilizations. Some of the people with whom
the Europeans came into contact were, of course, relatively

primitive. But nearly all of the people encountered in today's
underdeveloped areas were members of viable societies which

could satisfy the economic needs of the community. Yet these
societies were shattered when they came into contact with an ex73
panding Europe.

There are some who would carry Griffin's argument a step further, charging that even in the post-colonial era the Western im-

pact on the newly independent Third World countries has created
greater social inequity; that those Third World countries in which

the West has invested most heavily and which have attempted to
develop along Western lines have driven more and more of their
own people into the ranks of the impoverished. 74 In their book,
Economic Growth and Social Equity in Developing Countries,

Irma Adelman and Cynthia Morris present statistical evidence that
economic growth in the noncommunist Third World has often been
accompanied by an increase in the number of absolute poor-of
not merely a relative, but of an actual decline in the living
standard of the poorer segments of the society. 75 Adelman and
Morris find that social inequality is greatest in those countries having an abundance of natural resources controlled by foreign inter76
ests.
73. Id. at 41. See also Linton, supra note 68, at 243-44.
74. Diaz-Alejandro presents a graphic account of the negative impact of Western values on lesser developed countries (LDC):
...LDC upper and middle classes will feel grievously deprived if they
do not have access to the goods and services provided by the transnationals
and others in the capitalist centers. Their youth in particular will be seduced by that center's glitter. In those LDCs where demonstration effects
are also transmitted via tourism, the children of the rich will dream about
parties at the local Hilton, while the children of the poor will dream about
the chance to wash dishes there if they are unable to get the opportunity to
do so in New York or Paris.
Under those circumstances . . . trying to motivate the best and the

brightest youth by material incentives will doom the developing country to
persistent, or even growing inequality.
Diaz-Alejandro, Delinking North and South: Unshackled or Unhinged, in COUNCIL
ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 54, at 85, 101.
75. I. ADELMAN & C. MORRIS, ECONOMIC GROWTH AND SOCIAL EQUITY IN
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 189 (1973).
76. Id. at 186.
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It can also be argued that, even if the developed nations bear
no historical responsibility for the absolute poverty existing in the
developing world, it is still in their best interests to attempt to
eliminate this problem with a development program designed to
meet basic human needs. The authors of the 1976 Report to the
Club of Rome, Reshaping the International Order, argue that we
are all living in a highly interdependent world; problems such as
absolute poverty require international, not national, action. They
reason that the political and social upheavals that may result from
failing to take action will affect all nations. 7 7 In short, when developed nations resist change, poor nations and impoverished peoples
may resort to precipitating wars, irregular acts of violence, and ter78
rorism, "the last resort of the weak and desperate."
Even assuming that both developed and developing states are
willing to accept the obligation of working together to meet basic
human needs, there remains the obstacle of creating the legal and
economic infrastructure to implement this commitment. Presently,
as Richard Falk points out:
All governments affirm their commitment to the abolition of
poverty as a matter of national policy, just as all governments
deny the perpetration of any severe domestic violations of human rights. With basic human needs, however, there are no adequate procedures available to brand a particular government as
a violator, although a persuasive consensus can often be obtained
by media coverage, NGO reporting, and the activities of govern79
ments and international institutions.
Such ad hoc methods are commendable, but clearly inadequate. If the commitment in principle is to be translated into ef77. CLUB OF ROME, RESHAPING THE INTERNATIONAL ORDER (A. Dolman ed.
1976). But see the dissenting comment of Helmut Hesse:
Although I am fully convinced that the present world economy is in disorder, due to the problems described in this Report, and though I agree with
the argument that global cooperation, as elaborated, is needed to overcome
these problems, I cannot agree with some of the value judgments, arguments, and proposals made. Especially, I cannot agree with those value
judgments which come near to egalitarianism. I cannot blame the Western
industrialized countries for the severe inequalities in the world in the way
suggested in this Report.
Id. at 322.
78. Wriggins, Third World Strategies for Change: The Political Context of
North-South Interdependence, in W. WRIGGINS & G. ADLER-KARLSSON, supra note
55, at 21, 109.
79. Falk, Responding to Severe Violations, ENHANCING GLOBAL HUMAN
RIGHTS, supra note 23, at 242, 242.
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fective action in practice, there will have to be international agreement as to the precise obligations imposed on each state, the
procedures for determining whether a state has violated these obligations, and the methods of enforcing such a determination against
a recalcitrant state. Before such agreement can be reached, many
diffcult problems have to be resolved. For example, what should
be the standard of liability imposed upon governments? Will they
be held liable only when they intentionally deprive people of basic
human needs or even when they are merely negligent?8 0 Who will
be allowed to bring a claim that a government is violating the basic
economic rights of its poor-governments of other states, intergovernmental organizations, private nongovernmental groups, and/or
the poor themselves?
Complicating matters is the fact that even with a consensus on
making basic human needs an overriding goal of the international
community, there still may be sharp disagreement as to the appropriate economic strategies for meeting this goal. For example, if a
country lacks sufficient food to feed all of its people, the goal of
meeting this basic need is clear. But whether this is best achieved
by importing food in an attempt to meet the immediate shortage or
by importing agricultural technology in attempting to deal with the
long-term problem is open to question.8 1
Are states likely to accept or move toward such an agreement
on basic human needs in the 1980's? The answer is no. The reasons
for this pessimistic appraisal lie both in the implications of a basichuman-needs agreement and in other trends occurring in the international community.
There are two long-term implications inherent in a humanneeds agreement that make acceptance by developed and developing states highly unlikely. First, a successful agreement will inevitably result in significant inroads on state sovereignty. 8 2 The
idea that failing to meet basic needs will be considered a human
rights violation puts constraints on the way a state can manage its
own resources and economic development programs. Furthermore,
supporters of a basic-human-needs approach agree that it will be

80. For discussions of possible standards of liability, see id. at 224-26;
Schechter, Book Review, 72 AM. J. INT'L L. 161, 161-63 (1978).
81. The economic problems involved in trying to develop effective programs
to uplift the impoverished without further enriching the rich are discussed in CLUB
OF ROME, supra note 77, at 24-86; Adler-Karlsson, supra note 57; Hanson, supra note

58.
82.

CLUB OF ROME, supra note 77, at 82.
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necessary to endow an international organization with the authority
to manage transfers of resources from developed to developing nations. 8 3 In monitoring the use of these funds, that international organization is bound to put additional constraints on decisionmakers
in developing countries. To ensure the collection of adequate
funds, the organization will require the power to tax the developed
nations.
One view of the ultimate outcome of such an approach is presented in the Reshaping the International Order Report to the
Club of Rome:
Ultimately there is a need for the equivalent of a World
Treasury, the resources of which are derived from international
taxation and ownership of international productive resources
(such as the resources of the oceans). The basic objective of the
world developWorld Treasury would be to promote equitable
84
ment and the eradication of world poverty.
It is highly doubtful that even those developing states standing to
benefit most from such an agreement would be willing to surrender the amount of sovereignty required. 8 5 The developed states
probably will be even more intransigent. While in the short term
they might be surrendering less of their sovereignty, the developed states would be more frightened by the second long-term implication of adopting a basic-needs agreement: The possibility that
the developed states' economic growth and material comsumption
would have to yield to the goal of meeting basic human needs.
There are already claims that limits on economic growth and consumption in the developed countries are necessary:
No one's affluence should increase until everyone's essential
needs are fulfilled. This means in practice a maximum income or

83. Id. at 131, 218.

84. Id. at 133-34.
85. Diaz-Alejandro, supra note 61, at 155-56 suggests that developing countries
might indeed be extremely skeptical of the supposed benefits:
Why not argue for a worldwide war on poverty and oppression? To
those familiar with the rise and fall of the Alliance for Progress, the answer
is obvious: no Northern government has both the credibility and the resources to launch and lead such a program seriously and globally, not now
and not in the 1980s. Proposed global bargains between Northern and
Southern elites of the type involving more aid in exchange for more redistribution and democracy are at best utopian and at worst a new version of an
old confidence game.
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at least a maximum level of consumption for the rich, until the
poor have at least the minimum of absolute necessities. 8"
The amount of transformation of the world economy which
would foster a healthy pattern of development in third and
fourth worlds is such that there is bound to be a restrictive effect
in the first world

. . .

that is the natural price of equity or pro-

viding human economic and social rights for all.87

A pessimistic appraisal is reinforced by other trends in the international community. Decreasing stability of governments, growing populations, decaying environments, and declining economies
may block progress in enforcing political and civil as well as social
and economic rights. These trends, therefore, are the subject of
this Article's next section.
THE FuTuRE OF HuMAN RIGHTS:
IS A NEW, IMPROVED WORLD LEGAL ORDER

19 8 0's?
The 1980's appear more a decade of menace than of promise
for human rights. There are a number of interrelated factors which
will hinder the current state-oriented system's improvement, and
will almost certainly prevent the adoption of a more ambitious,
centralized system of protection.
Perhaps the most important of these factors-the one presenting the greatest single threat to human rights in the 1980's-is
the continued growth of world population. While there is some evidence that the growth rate may be slowing down, 88 world population in the 1980's will still increase by 800 million and possibly by
1 billion people.8 9 This will occur primarily in less-developed countries; at least seven out of every eight additional individuals will
live in the Third World. Demographic experts say the increase is
inevitable. 90 This poses a threat to human rights on many different
levels.
POSSIBLE IN THE

86. Adler-Karlsson, supra note 57, at 166-67.
87. Linton, supra note 68, at 246.
88. Hauser, Introduction and Overview, in WORLD POPULATION AND DEVELOPMENT 1, 11 (P. Hauser ed. 1979).
89. 2 COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY AND DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
THE GLOBAL 2000 REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 8 (1980); Tapinos, The World in the
1980s: Demographic Perspectives, in COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Six BILLION
PEOPLE 19, 28-29 (1978).
90. "The demographic situation in 1990 as we have described it will be the result of an ineluctable evolutionary pattern that no demographic policy, however coercive, can alter in such a brief period of time." Tapinos, supra note 89, at 74-75.
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First, this population explosion will have a direct and potentially devastating impact on attempts to meet basic human needs in
developing countries. The connection between population and poverty has received a great deal of attention. 9 ' While there has been
considerable debate about the causal relationship-whether overpopulation causes poverty or poverty causes overpopulation- 9 2 there
has been widespread acknowledgement that rapid population
growth in the developing countries, featuring large numbers of dependent young people, makes the task of meeting basic needs
much more difficult. Regarding basic nutritional needs, it has been
said that
[t]he future is not promising. It is possible that the nutritional gap between the more developed and less developed
countries will increase, because in poor countries rapid population growth has continued, and unless very drastic steps are
taken, the possibilities of increasing food production are slight. It
has been calculated that during the seventeenth century two
million people died of hunger. In the eighteenth century this
number increased to ten million and in the nineteenth century
to 25 million. What has happened and is happening in this century makes one suspect that the number of people dying of hunger will be still larger. 93
Insofar as population increases are due to high birth rates, rather
than declining death rates, educational needs will be difficult to
satisfy. Even if the birth rate is finally reduced, this reduction's im-

91. See, e.g., 1 UNrrED NATIONS DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS, THE POPULATION DEBATE: DIMENSIONS AND PERSPECTIVES 45, 413, U.N.

Doe. ST/ESA/SER.A/57 (1975).
92. On the political side the population debate is intense and is closely re-

lated to the broader debate over the conditions of human betterment. One
side of this debate holds that population growth is a relatively separable
problem that can be addressed through direct and specialized agencies
promoting fertility control. The other side holds that population growth is a
problem derived from a basic inequality in the distribution of wealth. From
this position the problem is addressed through major efforts to restructure
the world wide political-economic system.
Ness, OrganizationIssues in International PopulationAssistance, in WORLD POPULATION AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 88, at 615, 632.

To the extent that excessive population growth is caused by the maldistribution
of wealth and by the large number of people living in absolute poverty in the developing world, this is an additional argument for adopting an effective basic-humanneeds approach as outlined in the second section of this Article.
93. Minckeberg, Food and World Population: Future Perspectives, in WORLD
POPULATION AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 88, at 124, 126 (footnotes omitted).
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pact on the number of school-age children and the resulting educa94
tion costs will not be felt for almost another decade.
Second, the population increase may have a less direct but
nevertheless devastating impact on the protection of political and
civil rights within developing states. For, "as governments feel increasingly hard pressed in their efforts to cope with burgeoning
populations, they are more likely to direct repressive power against
those who disagree with their goals or their means of achieving
them." 95 While the relationship between population and political
repression has received less attention than the relationship between population and poverty, 9 6 there has been discussion of three
specific problems that will be of growing concern in the 1980's.
One problem arises in countries with a heterogeneous ethnic
composition and a significant difference in the rate of population
growth of the different ethnic groups. In such countries, the threat
of losing majority status may upset an already unstable condition
and provoke the threatened ethnic group, presently in power, into
97
repressing its rivals.
The second problem arises in the large number of developing
countries in which there has not only been a significant population
increase, but also a major influx of people into urban areas. This
shift in population distribution has caused additional social and economic stresses. The 1975 World Population Conference Report, for
example, remarks:
Urbanization in most countries is characterized by a number
of adverse factors: drain from rural areas through migration of in94.

Tapinos, supra note 89, at 64.

95. Ullman, Introduction: Human Rights-Towards International Action, in
ENHANCING GLOBAL HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 23, at 1.
96. The political significance of population dynamics has received little attention to date, in part because the visibility of the population problem is
such a recent phenomenon, in part because questions relating to population
have traditionally remained within the domain of demographers, biologists,
or nutritional experts, and in part because the recent emphasis upon the environmental problems occasioned by rapid growth has detracted from a focus
upon the less spectacular consequences of population dynamics.
N. CHOUCRI, POPULATION DYNAMIcs AND INTERNATIONAL VIOLENCE 3 (1974) (foot-

notes omitted). While it is generally recognized that the pressure of population upon
resources tends to contribute to internal instabilities and dislocations, the precise nature of the consequences are rarely specified in empirical terms. Id. at 203.
97. Tapinos, supra note 89, at 69-71 (discussing situations in Lebanon (Christians and Moslems), Israel (Jews and Arabs), Belgium (Flemish and Walloons), and
USSR (Russians and non-Russians) as examples); see N. CHOUCRU, supra note 96,
at 201.
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dividuals who cannot be absorbed by productive employment in
urban areas, serious disequilibrium in the growth of urban centers, contamination of the environment, inadequate housing and
98
services and social psychological stress.
The Conference Report goes on to recommend that remedial programs "[s]hould be avoided which infringe the right of freedom of
movement and of residence within the borders of each state as
enunciated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and
other international instruments." 9 9 Despite this recommendation,
it is likely that as population maldistribution intensifies in the
198 0's, some Third World governments may restrict movement
into urban areas or force resettlement out of urban areas in ways
that conflict with and abridge individual rights.1 00
Third, the population increase may escalate tensions between
states, making it more difficult to achieve international cooperation
in protecting human rights. Just as a rapidly increasing population
in a country with limited resources may lead to internal instability
and repression, it may also lead to external conflict and violence.
Based on a comparative cross-national study of conflicts in developing areas as well as a review of the literature on population dynamics, Nazli Choucri concludes:
When viewed in the context of a relatively constrained resource base, the consequences of rapid population growth appear
similar to those of population pressure and increased density ....
In some cases, such pressures contributed to internal political
instabilities. In others, where the effects were primarily external,
expansionist tendencies and hostile behavior appeared to emerge
from internal pressures. 10 1
Perhaps the most oft-cited example of population pressure as a
causal factor in international conflict is the El Salvador-Honduras
War of 1969. Both countries had very high population-growth
rates, but El Salvador, with only one fifth the land of Honduras,
98. United Nations, Report of the World Population Conference 1974 4, para.
44, U.N. Doe. E/CONF.60/19 (1975); see also 2 UNITED NATIONS DEPARTMENT OF
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS, supra note 91, at 413; Gosling, Population Redistribution: Patterns, Policies, and Prospects, in WORLD POPULATION AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 88, at 403, 420-22.
99. United Nations, supra note 98, at 15, para. 46(a).
100. For a detailed discussion of the human rights issues raised by controls on
internal migration, see Partan, Human Rights Aspects of Population Programs, in
WORLD POPULATION AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 88, at 486, 520-31.
101. N. CHOUCRI, supra note 96, at 203.
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had one and one half as many people. Because of the tremendous
pressure of population on scarce resources in El Salvador, approximately 300,000 Salvadorenos had migrated to Honduras. The expulsion of some of these migrants from Honduras after rioting at a
World Soccer Cup match between the two countries helped to precipitate the armed conflict.10 2 The key factor in the El SalvadorHonduras example-large-scale international migration caused by a
population growing too fast for domestic resources to keep pace
with basic needs-will become increasingly significant in the
1980's. It has been reported that
[i]nternational migration will certainly increase in numbers
in the 1980s. The bulk of this migration will be from the developing countries to the developed countries. In fact, legal migration from Africa, Asia and Latin America to Australia, Canada
and the United States doubled during the 1960s and will probably double again by the 1980s. Western Hemisphere immigration, legal and illegal, into the United States from Mexico and
the Caribbean will surely increase. Even now Mexico's annual
population increase of 2 million (over a population base of 60
million) exceeds the U.S.A.'s increase of 1.7 million (over a population base of nearly 220 million). In fact, estimated illegal immigration into the United States of nearly 1 million annually, if
accurate, almost equals the natural increase of present United
States citizens ....
By the 1980s, international migration will be a major issue.
It will seem to some nations as important politically as their own
national boundaries and as important economically as the price
of their major commodity exports. 10 3
International migration not only creates a specific class of people who are more at risk and need greater human rights protection, 10 4 but also presents a more general threat to cooperation be-

102. Id. at 148-60.
103. Piotrow, Population Policiesfor the 1980s: Meeting the Crest of the Demographic Wave, in COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 89, at 81, 147.
104. There are three classes of migrants who are at special risk. First, migrant
workers who, while nominally protected by legal guarantees and international agreements, may nevertheless find their rights sacrificed to the economic interests of the
countries of employment and of origin:
In Europe, the problem arises largely, though not exclusively, from the
recruitment of migrant labour to run the industrial undertakings. They are to
make up for the shortages in labour in Europe or for the refusal of its indigenous population to do certain unpleasant tasks. The surplus available in the
poorer developing countries is regarded as a "reserve labour force," to be
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tween developed and developing states in protecting human rights.
The seeds of conflict are planted in the differing attitudes toward
this movement of people. For governments of developing states,

the free flow of emigrants may represent a safety valve for population pressures. Migrant workers may also provide needed foreign

exchange. Developing states can argue that the developed states'

"obligation" to help create a more equitable international
order
should be met by taking people in as well as giving out aid.
For governments of developed states, the flow of immigrants
represents an unfair imposition brought about by the developing

countries' failure to deal responsibly with their own population
problems. People in developed states may view such immigration
with hostility. For instance, "some scholars see in this country
[U.S.] a kind of neo-nativism that perceives present-day immigrants as contaminating society. That attitude is said to be especially strong now, at a time of doubts and fears over inflation, limited resources and the country's ability to provide for its own. ' 105
used or disregarded as necessary. It is viewed almost entirely in terms of the
dynamics of the European capitalist industrial economy. The countries of origin of migrant labour do not often show any greater interest in the migrant.
Migrant labour is seen as an export whose remittances provide foreign exchange and whose absence from the State ease the pressure from Governments unable to cope with problems of neo-colonialism, corruption and inefficiency. It is, therefore, doubtful if there is any State or institution which is
truly concerned about the plight of the migrant in Europe. The fragility of
convention and legal guarantees before the forces of the market is a basic
factor to be taken into account.
Ghai, Populationand InternationalMigration: The Case of the Migrant Workers, in
2 UNITED NATIONS DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS, supra note
91, at 395, 401. See also Report of the Symposium on Population and Human Rights
(Amsterdam, Jan. 21-29, 1974), reprinted in 2 UNITED NATIONS DEPARTMENT OF
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS, supra note 91, at 720-22 (para. 110-120).

Second, illegal immigrants who are subject both to legal discrimination and extralegal exploitation.
In the United States, for example, the State of Texas does not provide free public school tuition for the education of illegal alien children. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN.

tit. 2, § 21.031 (Vernon) (Supp. 1979). In practice the state law deprives the children
of the basic right to education, since the tuition required is beyond the means of
most illegal alien parents. The statute has recently been struck down on equal protection grounds. Doe v. Plyler, 458 F. Supp. 569 (E.D. Tex. 1978). See also Blum, Illegal Aliens in New York: A Life of Fear, Costly to All, N.Y. Times, March 18, 1979,
at 1, col. 2.
Third, Political and economic refugees who can find no refuge.
Haupt, World's Refugees Finding No Refuge, 7 INTERCOM 1 (June-July 1979).
105. Stevens, Millions of Mexicans See Illegal Entry into U.S. as Gateway to
Opportunity, N.Y. Times, Feb. 12, 1979 § B at 10, col. 4.
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The validity of the views held on both sides is certainly open to
question. It can be argued that emigration is bad for developing countries and that immigration is good for the developed. 10 6 Nevertheless, it is clear that the migration problem is already a source
of strain between some developing and developed countries, 10 7 and
that during the 1980's the strain will become more severe. For
international migration policies will be under the same pressure
as fertility and trade policies in the 1970s to move out to the
strict context of national sovereignty and to take account of economic and social pressures. In other words, immigration and
emigration policies will not long continue to escape the cry for
social justice or a new international order. Yet at the same time
the economic capacity of the developed world to produce jobs
and the political capacity of any nation to absorb large ethnically
different, and highly nationalistic populations will decline.10 8
Migration problems will complicate and possibly subvert attempts to achieve further international cooperation in meeting basic needs and protecting political and civil rights. If, for example,
at the onset of a recession, developed nations immediately begin
laying off and expelling Third World migrant workers, they may
cause economic chaos in the Third World countries and jeopardize
human-needs programs. Additionally, when developed nations do
106. There are disadvantages to the country of origin. Because international migrants are usually more skilled or more enterprising than those who
remain behind, they leave a gap, especially in fields such as science, medicine, and engineering. The developing countries are loath to lose these professionals and try to restrict their departures, but so far they have proved
sufficiently clever and persistent to evade restrictions from their own countries. Even other types of immigrants, for example, guest workers who come
from southern to northern Europe on a temporary basis or Pakistanis and
Egyptians who find jobs in the Middle East, are semiskilled technicians
who are able to adapt to new jobs quickly. Basically, they represent the
cream of the labor force in their native countries. Is their departure really a
boon to their homelands? Do the cash remittances they send home really
compensate for the initial costs of raising and educating them and the later
loss of their personal initiative and enterprise? Does their departure speed
the fall of birthrates and encourage the remaining families, communities,
and even nations to hasten the development process?
Piotrow, supra note 103, at 148; see Shabecoff, 20 Million Termed Economic
Refugees-Study Views Migration in World as Symptom of a Money System 'Fundamentally Askew,' N.Y. Times, Dec. 2, 1979, at 43, col. 1.
107. Especially between the United States and Mexico. Shabecoff, supra note
106.
108. Piotrow, supra note 103, at 149.
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not treat illegal aliens with a minimum degree of dignity, it undermines their argument to the developing states that human rights
must be protected.
Finally, as population problems worsen, governments in developing countries may increasingly adopt more coercive population-control policies. In the 1960's and early 1970's the struggle for
human rights and the drive for population control appeared to be
largely complementary efforts. In an era when many governments
still had pro-natalist legislation and policies, both human rights and
zero-population-growth advocates could agree that parents should
have the "right" to limit the number of their children. Both groups
could advocate for the removal of restrictions on family-planning
information and technology. Both could demand that governments
actually provide the means for parents to engage in family
planning. Nevertheless, there was some recognition that governments might go even further in an anti-natalist direction and that
coercive measures by governments trying to limit reproduction
might create a serious human rights dilemma.10 9 This dilemma was
addressed by Luke T. Lee, commenting on the language in the
1968 Teheran Proclamation on Human Rights that "[p]arents have
a basic human right to determine freely and responsibly the number and spacing of their children:" 11 0
The question may be raised as to whether the language of
the Teheran Proclamation would allow couples to have as many
children as they want . . . . The Proclamation specifically provides that family planning must be made not only "freely," but
also "responsibly." Involved in a responsible parenthood is the balancing of the "individual" with the "collective" right [j]ust as the
"individual" right to freedom of speech must take into account
the "collective" right whether in time of peace (e.g., libel, defamation, nuisance, obscenity) or during war or emergency (e.g.,
treason, sedition, censorship), so must the "individual" right of
family planning be harmonized with the "collective" right under
certain circumstances as, for example, where the resources, both
actual and potential, of a country dictate the limitation of the
size of its population in the interest of all. The question of when

109. For a discussion of the possible future need for coercive population measures in the United States, see Note, Legal Analysis and Population Control: The
Problem of Coercion, 84 HARv. L. REv. 1856 (1971).
110. Proclamation of Teheran, Final Act of the International Conference on
Human Rights, 4 U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 32/41 (1968) (emphasis added).
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exactly does the "individual" right give way to the "collective"
right is always difficult to answer ...."il
The 1974 United Nations Symposium on Population and Human
Rights was deeply divided on the issue of whether and to what extent governments are entitled to use coercive measures on behalf
of this "collective" right:
Throughout the course of the Symposium there was concern among
some participants about the possibilities and dangers of States
using coercion. Most participants considered that coercive policies were unjustified and would amount to a serious denial of
important human rights ... .Other participants argued that it
was impossible to take a categorical position on that matter.
There was first the problem of defining coercion. Some forms of
action, like compulsory sterilization, might well be regarded as
unjustifiable coercion, but it might be otherwise with fiscal and
112
other measures which penalized parents of large families.
Wherever the line may be drawn between the "individual"
right to reproduce and the "collective" right to an adequate environment, human rights will be at special risk as governments adopt
more coercive population policies in the 1980's. Coercive measures
are all too likely to be applied in arbitrary or discriminatory
ways." 3 For "[e]ven if compulsory sterilization were acceptable on
a theoretical basis, administration of such a policy would present
: , * serious problems. [I]t is difficult to imagine a birth quota policy that could be developed without the introduction of some discriminatory rule against underprivileged groups."" 4 The problem
of unfair discrimination is not limited to compulsory sterilization. It
is also endemic to the use of "incentives" to reward small families
and "disincentives" to penalize large ones. An argument can certainly be made that it is fair to penalize parents who irresponsibly produce too many children. But, far too often, disincentives, such as denying educational benefits to the fourth and
111. Lee, Law, Human Rights and Population:A Strategy for Action, 12 VA. J.
INT'L L. 309, 317 (1972) (footnote omitted).
112. Report of the Symposium on Population and Human Rights, supra note
104, at 713, 724.
113. For a discussion of the arbitrary implementation of sterilizations in India,
see Nanda, India's Compulsory Sterilization Laws: The Human Right of Family
Planning,8 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 342 (1978).
114. UNESCO, HUMAN RIGHTS ASPECTS OF POPULATION PROGRAMMES 115

(1D77).
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subsequent children, will result in unfairly punishing children for
115
the sins of their parents.
The population increase in the 1980's, therefore, poses multi-

ple threats to the protection of human rights. Some of these threats
might be mitigated by rapid economic development. The economic
prognosis for the 1980's, however, suggests that declining rates of
economic growth may intensify, rather than ameliorate, these problems.

In the 1970's, the direct and indirect impact of massive oilprice increases sabotaged the economic-development plans of many

non-oil-exporting developing countries.11 6 Scarce resources had to
be diverted into paying the higher cost of fuels and fertilizers. At
the same time, higher oil prices helped to fuel inflation and recession in the developed nations, limiting their trade with and assis-

tance to the developing nations.117 The United Nations forecasts little improvement for the first half of the 1980's. 11 8 High oil prices

(slow growth in the developed countries lowering their demand for
goods from the developing countries), continued inflation, and lack
115. The prime example of using disincentives is Singapore. In August 1973,
the following disincentives went into effect: Higher delivery fees; limitation of paid
maternity leave to cover two children only; reduction of income tax relief to cover
three children only; lower priority for choice of primary school admission for children of fourth birth order and above; and elimination of priority for large families in
the allocation of subsidized housing. K~e & Loh, Singapore, 5 STUDIES IN FAMILY
PLANNING 145 (1974). For a discussion of the ethical issues involved in the use of incentives, see Veatch, Governmental PopulationIncentives: Ethical Issues at Stake, 8
STUDIES IN FAMILY PLANNING 100 (1977).
116. Miller, In Poor Lands, Oil Price Increases Shock Economies and Erode
Hopes, N.Y. Times, July 4, 1979, at 1, col. 4.
117. UNITED NATIONS DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS,
WORLD ECONOMIC SURVEY, 1979-1980 at 55-59, U.N. Doc. ST/esa/106 (1980).

118. [P]rospects for economic growth in the world economy in the immediate years ahead are generally expected to be somewhat gloomy. 1980 is a
year of economic deceleration for the world economy as a whole ....
Growth prospects for the developing market economies in 1980-82, are
expected to differ significantly in the oil-exporting and the oil-importing
groups ....

The immediate prospects for the oil-importing developing countries are
not encouraging. A number of adverse factors will be working against them:
the expected slow growth in the developed market economies will put a
brake on their volume of imports and, together with protectionist tendencies, will limit exports of the developing countries; high rates of inflation will
lead to a continuous increase in world prices of manufactured goods . . . and
services required to support their growth. Added to these adverse features
are uncertainties about the future volume of capital inflows and concessional
aid from the industrial countries.
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of sufficient aid and investment will cause economic distress to
many developing countries. Other forecasts for the decade predict
major jumps in oil prices, further debilitating the non-oil-exporting

developing nations.11 9
Another malady, environmental decay, may complicate these

economic ills. The recently released Global 2000 Report to the
President insists that environmental decay is already a major problem in some developing countries:
Examples of serious deterioration of the earth's most basic
resources can already be found today in scattered places in all
nations, including the industrialized countries and the better endowed LDCs . . . But problems related to the decline of the

earth's carrying capacity are most immediate, severe, and tragic
in those regions of the earth containing the poorest LDCs.
Sub-Saharan Africa faces the problem of exhaustion of its resource base in an acute form. Many causes and effects have
come together there to produce excessive demands on the environment, leading to expansion of the desert. Overgrazing,
fuelwood gathering, and destructive cropping practices are the
principal immediate causes of a series of transitions from open
woodland, to scrub, to fragile semiarid range, to worthless weeds
and bare earth. Matters are made worse when people are forced
by scarcity of fuelwood to burn animal dung and crop wastes.
The soil, deprived of organic matter, loses fertility and the ability to hold water-and the desert expands. In Bangladesh,
Pakistan, and large parts of India, efforts by growing numbers of
people to meet their basic needs are damaging the very
cropland, pasture, forests, and water supplies on which they
must depend for a livelihood. To restore the lands and soils
would require decades-if not centuries--after the existing pressures on the land have diminished. But the pressures are
growing, not diminishing.120

These are ominous tidings for those concerned with human rightswhether the particular focus is on a healthful and decent environment as a basic human right, 12 1 on the basic-needs aspect of hu-

man rights, or on traditional political and civil rights.
Progress in protecting political and civil rights also depends
119.

0. NORENG, OIL POLITICS IN THE 1980S 109-21 (1978) (Noreng's forecasts

predate 1978 oil price rise).
120. 1 COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY AND THE DEPARTMENT OF
STATE, supra note 89, at 41 (emphasis in original).
121. See W. GORMLEY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND ENVIRONMENT: THE NEED FOR
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION 1 (1976).
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upon government stability. In countries where there are frequent
extraconstitutional turnovers in government, ongoing civil wars, or
extensive terrorist activities, existing rights will be at risk and there
will be scant hope for extending human rights protection. The current world community contains many such unstable governments.
In 1979 alone, there were at least a dozen attempts to overthrow
of civil war12 3
government leaders, 122 and almost as many instances
12 4
activities.
and of countries plagued by terrorist
The outlook for government stability in the 1980's is bleak.
The problems outlined above-increasing population, declining
economies, and decaying environments-are likely to further undermine government stability. 12 5 While these problems may have
their greatest political impact in the developing world, they may
affect some of the poorer developed countries as well.126 Studies
focusing on particular regions of the world, such as Africa, reinforce this gloomy forecast:
Africa's postcolonial conditions of political instability will, if
anything, be greater in the 1980s than in the tvo previous decades. The struggles to achieve internal equilibrium within, the
continent's multiethnic evolving nation-states and to construct a
continental security system are likely to elude early solutions
122. The list of coups includes: Afghanistan (successful); Argentina (attempted
coup); Bolivia (coup which initially succeeded, but collapsed after two weeks); Central African Republic (successful); Chad (attempted coup); Dominican Republic (alleged attempted coup); El Salvador (successful coup); Equatorial Guinea (successful
coup); Ghana (unsuccessful coup followed by successful coup); Granada (successful
coup); Iraq (alleged attempted coup); Republic of Korea (President assassinated); Sao
Tome (alleged attempted coup); Uganda (through outside military action).
The lists for notes 122-124 were derived from the survey of political developments in individual countries provided in POLITICAL HANDBOOK OF THE WORLD:
1980 (A. Banks & W. Overstreet eds. 1980). The reader should note that ours are
rough categorizations. Arguably, some situations might fit in different categories, e.g.,
Northern Ireland in the list of countries with civil wars rather than those with terrorist activity.
123. The list of civil wars includes: Chad, Iran, Kampuchea (with Vietnamese
involvement), Lebanon, Mauretania (involving Western Sahara), Namibia, Nicaragua, and Zimbabwe.
124. Countries with extensive terrorist activity include: Chile, Columbia, El
Salvador, Guatemala, Israel, Italy, Nepal, Saudi Arabia (seizure of the Mosque),
Spain (Basque), and the United Kingdom (Northern Ireland).
125. For discussion of the "catalytic effect" of economic decline on military
coups, see Zimmerman, Toward a Causal Model of Military Coups d'Etat, 1979
ARMED FORCES & Soc'Y 387, 396. For a review of the literature on this point, see
text accompanying notes 54-58 supra.
126. Spivak, Root of Violence-Italian Red Brigades are Seen as Products of
FalteringEconomy, Wall St. J., Apr. 17, 1978, at 1, col. 1.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol9/iss2/3

38

Schechter: The Views of "Charterists" and "Skeptics" on Human Rights in the
CHARTEPdSTS AND SKEPTICS

1981]

and will in all probability produce recurrent breakdowns within

the 50-odd countries involved as well as precipitate damaging
conflicts between states . . .. At the same time, the deepening
economic crises facing most African countries will contribute to

continental and governmental instability.

.... 127

The strains of growing populations, declining economies, and decaying environments are not only likely to lead to more unstable
governments, but to more repressive ones as well. 12 8 Furthermore,
these more repressive governments may be less willing to participate in new international cooperative efforts to deal with the underlying population, economic, and environmental problems. As
Professor Falk has written:
The argument . . .is that the quality of the governance structure, as it pertains to the way in which a government maintains
order and promotes justice within its boundaries, influences the

manner in which it acts in external relations to the world. In
particular, the substitution of highly coercive rules for consensual rule tends to inhibit the impact of those social forces that

would move with the tides of history to build some sort of global
community policy that would alone give promise that our future

will not be beset by catastrophe on an unprecedented scale. For
this reason, the global trend, manifest on the state level in all
sectors of world society toward authoritarian rule is at once sig29
nificant and discouraging.1
127.

Legum, Communal Conflict and InternationalIntervention in Africa, in

COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, AFRICA IN THE

1980s 21, 65 (1979); see Enloe,

Ethnic Diversity: The Potentialfor Conflict, in COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
DIVERSITY AND DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 135 (1977) (consideration of ethnic conflict as destabilizing factor in Southeast Asia during 1980s); Zartman, Social
and Political Trends in Africa in the 1980s, in COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
AFRICA IN THE 1980s, supra, at 67, 73-85 (impact of excessive population and insufficient economic growth on African nations).
128. When resources are scarce, when there are too many mouths to feed,
when governments feel impelled ... to pursue programs of great austerity,
then opposition grows .... Regimes that ... feel hard pressed lash out to
assure adherence to rules or to stifle dissent. In turn, repressive actions often generate more opposition from opponents, now even more determined,
who may counter official repression with terror. And terror, in its turn, gives
rise to more widespread and indiscriminate official repression.
Ullman, supra note 95, at 2.

129. R.

FALK,

A

WORLD ORDER PERSPECTIVE ON AUTHORITARIAN TENDENCIES

3-4 (1980). Falk remains undiscouraged. "Despite this bleak outlook, there are constructive responses available to those who believe in system-change guided by
WOMP [World Order Models Project] values. The overall goal is to establish patterns of humane governance at all levels of social organization (from family to
planet)." Id. at 57. Watson would undoubtedly charge Falk with "unsubstantiated
optimism." See text accompanying note 10 supra.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1981

39

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 9, Iss. 2 [1981], Art. 3
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol, 9: 357

Given the environmental, economic, and political trends described above, one is forced to be a "skeptic"-to doubt whether
the 1980's will be a time for any significant improvement in human
rights protection. 130
CONCLUSION

In my critique of Watson and Lane, I have suggested that
Watson is too pessimistic about the current status of human rights
protection, Lane is too optimistic about prospects for improving
the current situation, and both are somewhat shortsighted in overlooking the importance of basic social and economic rights. To my
mind, the most significant difference between Lane and Watson is
in their recommendations. Lane wants us to sally forth on a crusade to change the current system; Watson wants us to stay home
and leave bad enough alone.
Watson has a point when he reminds us that there is no guarantee that a new centralized authority would be free from many of
the current state system's ills. Moreover, as I have suggested
above, a centralized authority empowered to provide for the basic
needs of the world's poor would require a substantial economic sacwho are living in the United States
rifice on the part of those of us131
and other developed countries.
Nevertheless, I do not find Watson's argument convincing. If,
in fact, the current system is as bad as he claims, could a new centralized authority be much worse? A more positive argument for
130. It is worth noting that most of the contributors to the Council on Foreign
Relation's volume on human rights in the 1980's Enhancing Global Human Rights,
while pressing for major reforms, are also skeptical about how much progress is possible in the decade ahead.
For example, Nigel Rodley makes the following forecast:
I do not have the wisdom to predict how socioeconomic conditions will
evolve in the developing countries. My personal suspicion is that little effective change will take place without left-wing revolutions; that such revolutions be waged by forces that have little time for the concept of human
rights, with the support of powers that demonstrate little respect for human
rights in their own spheres; that the forces of economic and social repression they seek to overthrow will be supported by those who claim to be
concerned with human rights and indeed who largely protect them for their
own populations; and that successful revolutionary movements, for a long
time to come, will not be required by their populations to demonstrate
compliance with standards and norms inspired by the societies that contributed to their own previous repression. If this is so, the outlook for human
rights is gloomy ....
Rodley, supra note 63, at 128-29.
131. See text accompanying note 85 supra.
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change is that a centralized authority would be more immune from
the local passions and prejudices that often lead to human rights violations. This proposition is supported by the English experience
with the European Convention on Human Rights. Before the
United Kingdom became a party to the Convention, and again before it accepted the right of individual petition, there were many
who claimed that individual rights were protected perfectly well by
domestic English law. Some in England maintained that ceding the
power of review to a foreign authority might well be harmful to
these rights. 3 2 Subsequently, the British Government's treatment
of East-African Asian immigrants' 33 and alleged I.R.A. terrorists 3 4
made it clear that even democratic governments can violate individual rights when dealing with unpopular groups in times of stress,
and that review by an impartial, outside authority is necessary.
Therefore, I support Lane's call for the reduction of sovereign
power and the grant of plenary jurisdiction to a transnational
body. 1 35 I do so not only because the current state-centered sys-

tem cannot fully protect human rights, but because it cannot effec-

132.

Mr. Bevin:

We have not at this stage undertaken to sign the optional clause. We think
that in this country, with our obligations not only at home but overseas, our
procedure for appeals stand very high and we are not prepared, without further thought, to hand over these appeal rights to another body. I believe that
if we proceeded to do so that there would be a very keen debate in this
House by hon. Members of the legal profession. Therefore, we have not
agreed to sign that clause, and that is where we stand at the moment.
170 PARL. DEB. H.C. (5th ser.) 1503 (1950).
Sir H. Williams asked the Attorney General what legislation will be signed, in
view of the fact that His Majesty's Government has signed the Charter of Human
Rights.
The Attorney General:
It is not contemplated that any legislation will be
necessary in order to give effect to the terms of the
Convention.
Sir H. Williams:
Are we to understand that the Charter has made
really no difference as far as this country is concerned?
The Attorney General: I think that we are entitled to say that the law of
this country has always been in advance of the
laws of most other countries in regard to human
rights.
171 PARL. DEB. H.C. (5th ser.) 15 (1950).

133.

East African Asians v. United Kingdom, [1970] Y.B. EUROPEAN

CONVEN-

TION ON HUMIAN RIGHTS 928 (Eur. Ct. of Human Rights).

134. Ireland v. United Kingdom, Eur. Court of Human Rights, Judgment of 13
Dec. 1977, Ser. A, Vol. 25.
135. See text accompanying note 7 supra.
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tively meet the other global problems of our time. Moreover, as I
have shown in the last two sections of this Article, significant progress in human rights protection cannot occur by itself. It is inextricably intertwined with and dependent upon improved responses
to the basic social, economic, and ecological problems that confront us.
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